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Abstract
The paper discusses comparative generic sentences As are F-er than
Bs—girls do better than boys in grade school, for example—which pose severe
problems for extant accounts. In their stead, the paper proposes reconceiv-
ing the LF of generic sentences as more closely akin to that of sentences
containing non-generic plurals, paradigmatically plural deﬁnite descrip-
tions. Given this one crucial change, several otherwise puzzling features
of comparative generics are immediately explicable, including their rela-
tively weak truth conditions and some of the logical relations they enter
into.
Keywords semantics   natural language   generics   comparatives  
plurals   distributivity
1 Introduction
Many paradigmatic generic sentences seem to express quite strong generaliza-
tions, ones that might not hold universally, but whose exceptions are plausibly
considered deviations from the norm, such as (1) and (2).
(1) Ravens are black.
(2) Tigers have stripes.
∗The initial impetus for writing this paper came from a challenge by Carrie Jenkins to account
for generic comparisons within the framework of quantiﬁcational theories of generics. An ances-
tor of this paper was given at the conference ‘Generics: Interpretation and Use’ in Paris in 2009.
I want to thank the participants there for many helpful suggestions. I also want to thank three
anonymous reviewers for this journal.
1A semantic theory for generics starting out from these examples may well an-
alyze them as true just in case most or all of the normal members of the kind
satisfy the property predicated. Let’s call such a theory a strong quantiﬁca-
tional theory—I’ll give a more precise statement below.
There are, however, many examples that cast doubt on the basic workabil-
ity of this approach. These are all true generics which an analysis in terms of
all normal or most seems to predict to be false. This paper discusses a subclass
of these problem cases, illustrated by (3) and (4).
(3) Girls do better than boys in grade school.
(4) Horses are taller than cows.
(3) is not appropriately paraphrased as saying that all normal girls do better
in grade school than all normal boys nor as saying that most girls do better
than most boys. The former is clearly too strong, the latter can be true even
when (3) is false. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, of (4). Sentences like (3)
and (4) are what I’ll call generic comparisons: sentences of the form As are F-er
than Bs.
Generic comparisons are particularly interesting for at least two reasons.
First, they resist a treatment that is plausible for many other potential counter-
examples to strong quantiﬁcational theories. Lions have manes or chickens lay
eggs are true, even though neither all normal nor most lions have manes, and
even though neither all normal nor most chickens lay eggs. These cases can
nonetheless be analyzed as involving a suitable restriction of the domain of
quantiﬁcation so that, in the restricted domain, the paraphrase in terms of
most or all normal is appropriate. Proponents of this strategy have to answer
many questions, such as what exactly the relevant restriction is and what
factors determine it. But at least it does not seem completely ad hoc that such
a restriction is available. Unfortunately, appeals to such a restriction won’t
help with generic comparisons. Very basic features of strong quantiﬁcational
theories conspire to predict truth conditions for generic comparatives that are
far too strong.
Second, these examples are completely systematic. Other sentences that
are often cited as problematic for strong quantiﬁcational theories, such as
mosquitos carry plasmodia or sharks attack bathers are isolated, and the intu-
itions of well-informed native speakers vary on their acceptability. By con-
2trast, generic comparisons form a systematic class of troublesome cases, and
intuitions concerning their truth-values are very ﬁrm.
In particular, I want to highlight two relevant cases that will guide much
of the discussion to follow. First, here is a case that intuitively veriﬁes (3),
described in terms of a distribution of scholastic achievement (1)—I’ll call it
the shift scenario.
Girls
Boys
%
Achievement
Figure 1: shift
Though some boys outperform many of the girls, the distribution of scholas-
tic achievement among girls is systematically shifted to the right of that among
boys. By contrast, here is a situation that intuitively falsiﬁes (3). I’ll call it the
sandwich scenario.
£
sandwich
¤
Scholastic achievement among boys is quite heavily polarized: a
third of all boys are excellent, so good in fact that the boys in that third
are all better than any girl. The other two thirds of boys is terrible, so
bad in fact that the boys in these two thirds are all worse than even the
weakest girl.
The challenge for semantic theories of generics is to predict that (3) is true in
the shift but false in the sandwich scenario.1 One of my major claims in this
paper is that no extant theory can meet it.
Several options are available to attempt a solution to the problem, drawing
on one or another proposal offered to deal with other problem cases. Below,
I’ll consider the prospects of analyzing generic comparisons as kind predi-
cations, following some remarks of Krifka et al. (1995, 83) who recommend
this strategy for many otherwise troublesome examples. I’ll also consider the
1Note, for example, that a paraphrase of (3) in terms of most is true in the sandwich scenario.
3possibility of using the alternative generic quantiﬁer that Cohen (1999b, 54ff)
introduces to deal with the (in)famous (5).
(5) Dutchmen are good sailors.
I’ll argue that both of these approaches are empirically inadequate, as are
some natural extensions of their motivating ideas not discussed in the litera-
ture. In their stead, I’ll propose a compositional semantics for generic compar-
isons that derives their relatively weak truth conditions as an interaction effect
between a strong generic quantiﬁcational element and independently moti-
vated aspects of the interpretation of comparatives in plural constructions.
Doing so forces us to reconceive the LF of even simple generic sentences like
(1) and (2).
After some preliminaries in §2, I formulate the problem the interpretation
of generic comparisons pose more precisely in §3. There, I also explain why
I reject alternative approaches. §4 contains the positive proposal, beginning
with a discussion of comparatives in non-generic plurals and extending the
treatment to generic comparisons.
2 Preliminaries
I have so far spoken of generics simpliciter, but I need to narrow my focus since
generics form a semantically and syntactically heterogeneous class. Some
seem to explicitly predicate a property of a kind, such as ravens are widespread
or dodos are extinct. I want to set these aside.2 I also want to set aside merely
existential sentences containing bare plurals, such as ravens are on my lawn.
Finally, I’ll only discuss sentences with bare plural subjects, not ones with
singular deﬁnite or indeﬁnite descriptions. I’ll call the sentences under inves-
tigation characterizing sentences.3
I impose these restrictions because the phenomenon of interest seems to
be conﬁned to bare plural generics, as the examples in (6) illustrate.
(6) a. A girl does better than a boy in grade school.
2That is not to say that a semantics for generics can simply treat the fact that bare plurals ap-
pear in both kind-predications and in generalizations like (3) and (4) as an orthographic accident.
But we face enough problems without trying to solve that one, too.
3Save for my restriction to bare plurals, my terminology coincides with that of Krifka et al.
(1995).
4b. The girl does better than the boy in grade school.
While (3) can be true in a situation in which there is signiﬁcant overlap in
performance, such as the shift, (6a) and (6b) cannot—if they are even inter-
pretable as generics.
A quantiﬁcational account of characterizing sentences adopts two hypothe-
ses, one about the proposition these sentences express, the other about their
LF and compositional semantics. The ﬁrst holds that there is a systematic,
albeit complex, relationship between facts about the distribution of properties
among individuals (perhaps across possible worlds and times) and the truth
of a distinctively generic proposition conveyed by a characterizing sentence.
It holds, for example, that there are certain distributions of blackness among
ravens (across space, time, and possible worlds) such that, if and only if any
one of them obtains, the generic proposition that ravens are black is true. Like-
wise, there are certain distributions of stripiness among tigers (across space,
time, and possible worlds) such that, if and only if any one of them obtains,
the generic proposition that tigers have stripes is true. We can mark this cor-
relation between facts about individuals and the truth of generic propositions
by introducing a generic quantiﬁer gen into our metalanguage and saying
that the generic proposition expressed by, e.g., ravens are black is a quantiﬁed
proposition, the proposition [gen x: Raven(x)](Black(x)).
At this point, we face the theoretically important question about how to
further describe this proposition, which is to say, what the systematic rela-
tionship between facts about individuals and the truth of generic propositions
is. Much of the debate concerning the semantics of characterizing sentences
is about just this question, although strictly speaking, this is not directly a
semantic issue.4 It is not a semantic issue because so long as we agree that
generics express propositions, all of the prevailing semantic approaches are
compatible with the view that generic facts that make generic propositions
true are not metaphysically basic, including kind-predicating views such as
Carlson (1977).
The second hypothesis characteristic of quantiﬁcational accounts speciﬁ-
cally concerns semantics. Not only is the proposition expressed by a charac-
terizing sentence quantiﬁcational, its logical form is, too. A quantiﬁcational
4See Krifka et al. (1995, §1.2.6.) for an overview of some of the options, as well as Pelletier and
Asher (1997).
5element in their LF, call it gen, encodes the relationship between facts about in-
dividuals and the truth of the generic proposition expressed by the sentence.5
Saying only this much about quantiﬁcational theories leaves open various se-
mantic and syntactic options. They leave open where in the LF the generic
quantiﬁer originates, whether it is a determiner of the bare plural, an adverb
of quantiﬁcation, or something else. They also leave open the meaning of gen.
A strong quantiﬁcational account takes a stand on that meaning. Since
generics tolerate exceptions, gen can obviously not be analyzed as a universal
quantiﬁer. A strong quantiﬁcational account analyzes it as something that
falls just short, such as quantiﬁcation over most of the members of the kind or
all of the normal ones. I already mentioned the intuitive sense that the initial
examples (1) and (2) are appropriately paraphrased as strong generalizations.
Perhaps more important is the more directly empirical observation that some
generics are false even though most members of the kind at issue conform to
the generalization, as in (7).
(7) a. Books are paperbacks.
b. Prime numbers are odd.
Since (7a) and (7b) are both false, even though the majority of books are pa-
perbacks, and the vast majority of prime numbers are odd, (7a) and (7b) must
express very strong generalizations.6
3 Inappropriate Truth Conditions
Consider again (3), repeated here.
(3) Girls do better than boys in grade school.
5Thus, gen is the element in the object language that appears in the LF of characterizing sen-
tences, gen the quantiﬁer in the metalanguage used to interpret the object language gen.
6Quantiﬁers in the generalized quantiﬁer description are usually identiﬁed as second-order
properties that satisfy permutation invariance, conservativity, and extension. However, for
the purposes of this discussion, I won’t assume that the generic operator gen satisﬁes these
constraints—this practice seems to be in line with how quantiﬁcational accounts of generics are
usually discussed. The reason to call the accounts I discuss in the main text quantiﬁcational is that
there is an element that encodes the relationship between the instantiation of a property among
the individuals making up a kind and the corresponding generic, a relationship that is broadly
speaking about how many.
6We need make only very few and weak assumptions in order to predict in-
appropriate truth conditions for (3). Being explicit about them allows us to
categorize responses to the problem posed.
First, we need to assume that (3) has a quantiﬁcational LF. Second, both
bare plurals are interpreted generically, so that both are associated with a
generic quantiﬁer. Third, the generic quantiﬁer that appears in the LF of
(3) is the same strong quantiﬁer as appears in the LF of the initial examples
(1) and (2). Fourth, and ﬁnally, the generic quantiﬁer occupies one of two
standard positions for quantiﬁers: a nominal determiner or an unselective
binder modeled on Lewis (1973).7
At this point, it will be useful to say something about how I will assume we
interpret comparatives, and especially how quantiﬁers are interpreted when
they occur in the scope of comparatives. Since I want to argue that we cannot
get a proper treatment of generic comparisons given the assumptions I’ve just
set out, I want to assume the most ﬂexible theory of comparatives and their
interactions with quantiﬁcation. I will essentially employ the theory offered
by Schwarzschild (2008), what he calls the A-not-A approach. On this view,
a comparative a is F-er than b is interpreted in two steps. First, a and b are
mapped to a degree on a scale associated with F-ness. The comparative then
says that a meets or exceeds some threshold that b fails to meet or exceed (i.e.,
one that b falls below).8 Consider example (8).
(8) John is taller than Bill.
In order to evaluate this sentence, John and Bill are both mapped to a degree
of height (the scale associated with tallness), and (8) is true iff there is some
threshold that John’s degree of height meets or exceeds and that Bill’s height
neither meets nor exceeds. In formal terms:
(9) ∃θ
¡
height(j,θ) ∧ ¬height(b,θ)
¢
Schwarzschild’s proposal is especially well-suited to my purposes since it
posits that the predicate appears twice in the semantic interpretation of the
comparative, and the occurrence that corresponds to the object in the initial
sentence is within the scope of negation. That means that once we introduce
7For the determiner option, see, e.g., Asher and Morreau (1995); for the adverb of quantiﬁca-
tion option, see Cohen (1999a,b); Schubert and Pelletier (1989); Wilkinson (1991)).
8See, also Kennedy (1999, 2007).
7other scope-taking operators, such as quantiﬁers, we have further options to
consider. But if extant treatments of generics still cannot give a proper inter-
pretation of (3), that gives us good reason to look elsewhere.9
With this in mind, let me turn to the interpretation of (3). By the ﬁrst
assumption, (3) has quantiﬁcational truth conditions. By the second, both
bare plurals introduce variables bound by a generic quantiﬁer. Suppose that
this generic quantiﬁer is a nominal determiner (the ﬁrst option for the fourth
assumption). In that case, (3) can be paraphrased as saying that gen-many
girls do better in grade school than gen-many boys. Put in formal terms,
we have two possible interpretations here, depending on how the scope of
generic quantiﬁer that binds the variable associated with boys is related to the
negation in the comparative construction. The possibilities are given in (10a)
and (10b).
(10) a.
£
gen x: Girl(x)
¤£
∃θ
¤¡
Does.Well(x,θ)∧
[gen y: Boy(y)](¬Does.Well(y,θ))
¢
b.
£
gen x: Girl(x)
¤£
∃θ
¤¡
Does.Well(x,θ)∧
¬[gen y: Boy(y)](Does.Well(y,θ))
¢
By the third assumption, these formulae have roughly the following truth
conditions. We interpret (10a) as saying that all normal or most girls meet or
exceed a threshold that all normal or most boys fail to meet. These are the
truth conditions most naturally understood for (11a) or (11b).
(11) a. Every normal girl does better in grade school than every normal
boy.
b. Most girls do better in grade school than most boys.
(11a) is far too strong, since it is false in the shift scenario. (11b) is too weak,
since it predicts that (3) is true in the sandwich scenario, since all of the girls
do better than two thirds of the boys.
Turning now to (10b), we ﬁnd excessively weak truth conditions. In line
with the third assumption, it is interpreted roughly as saying that all normal
9This proposal is useful for another reason. It essentially assumes that all comparatives are
“clausal,” i.e., that the LF of a sentence like (8), John is taller than Bill is John is taller than Bill is
tall. This is a very plausible hypothesis insofar as bare plurals in object position are not usually
interpreted generically—see Diesing (1992). That suggests in turn that when bare plurals are
interpreted generically, they’re not really in object-position, but are instead in a clause.
8or most girls meet or exceed a threshold that not all normal or most boys meet
or exceed, i.e., that all normal or most girls exceed a threshold that at least one
normal boy fails to meet. In other words, it says that all normal girls do better
than the weakest normal boy (and mutatis mutandis for a most-interpretation).
That is far too weak.
The situation is no different if gen is an unselective quantiﬁer that occupies
the position of an adverb of quantiﬁcation. In that case, we would paraphrase
(3) as saying that generically (generally, typically), a girl does better in grade
school than a boy, i.e., as saying that gen-many pairs  x,y  satisfy the condi-
tion. Given, again, that we’re interpreting the generic quantiﬁer as a relatively
strong quantiﬁer, we predict that (3) has roughly the truth conditions of the
examples in (12).
(12) a. In all normal cases, a girl does better than a boy in grade school.
b. Mostly, a girl does better than a boy in grade school.
As before, these truth conditions are far too strong. Regardless of whether
we pursue the nominal determiner or the adverb of quantiﬁcation options,
the asserted relation—doing better in grade school—has to hold between any
pair we can form by taking one of gen-many girls and one of gen-many boys,
and that in turn entails that the weakest of the gen-many girls still does better
than the strongest of the gen-many boys.
One of the four assumptions has to go. My own account will reject the
fourth, that the generic quantiﬁer occupies one of the standard positions. By
way of motivation, I’ll consider rejecting one of the other three. I’ll begin with
the ﬁrst, that generic comparisons like (3) should be analyzed quantiﬁcation-
ally (§3.1). I’ll then consider a proposal on which we reject the third, that the
generic quantiﬁer is analyzed as a strong quantiﬁer (§3.2). Finally, I’ll con-
sider rejecting the second assumption, that both of the NPs are interpreted
generically. The core idea is that the object NP—boys in girls do better than boys
in grade school—is a dependent plural (§3.3).
3.1 Kind-Reference and Other Aggregative Proposals
Generic comparisons are at least superﬁcially similar to paradigmatic char-
acterizing sentences. Nonetheless, one could try to assimilate them to such
9kind-predicating sentences as ravens are widespread, which predicate a prop-
erty of a kind directly. This is the proposal of Krifka et al. for many sentences
that would otherwise spell trouble for a strong quantiﬁcational theory. In
essence, the strategy is to transfer the semantics for comparatives involving
individuals, such as (8), John is taller than Bill, without the detour through
quantiﬁcation. We simply move from comparing particular objects to compar-
ing kinds.
In this case, each of the kinds mentioned is mapped to a degree on an
appropriate scale, and the generic comparison As are F-er than Bs is true just
in case there is a threshold on the scale of F-ness that the As—considered as
a kind—meet or exceed and which the Bs fail to meet or exceed. Since it is
surely a context-sensitive matter how the relevant degrees are determined, the
account makes no general prediction about the relationship between the de-
grees to which individual As and Bs are F and the degrees the corresponding
kinds are assigned. The account therefore isn’t saddled with predicting in-
appropriate truth conditions, largely because it makes no general predictions
on this point, at all. But that need not be ad hoc. The kind-referring strategy
should liken the determination of the relevant mapping to the determination
of the reference of demonstratives: saying how either determination is made
is no part of the semantics of these expressions, and in neither case should we
think that this division of labor is at all problematic.
Prima facie, this proposal is theoretically unattractive because it denies the
apparent similarities between generic comparisons and paradigmatic charac-
terizing sentences, since the latter are given a broadly quantiﬁcational treat-
ment while the former are not. However, I here only want to focus on a
more straightforwardly empirical problem, to wit, that this proposal draws
the analogy between comparisons of individual objects and generic compar-
isons too closely. The two kinds of comparisons exhibit different patterns of
logical compatibility and entailment, and the kind-predicating strategy cannot
account for this difference.
When comparing two individual objects where both can be associated with
degrees on the relevant scale, it will always be true that one stands in the
comparative relation to the other, the other to the one, or that they are equal.
That is to say, one of the schemas in (13) must be true.10
10In example (13c), and all of the corresponding examples below, I insert the parenthetical
10(13) a. a is F-er than b.
b. b is F-er than a.
c. a is (exactly) as F as b.
In the case of John, Bill, and comparisons of tallness, if there is a degree to
which John is tall, and there is a degree to which Bill is tall, then one of the
following three sentences must be true.
(14) a. John is taller than Bill.
b. Bill is taller than John.
c. John is (exactly) as tall as Bill.
However, the corresponding pattern does not hold for generic comparisons,
as the examples in (15) show—assume as before that we measure the height
of a quadruped at the shoulder.
(15) a. Cows are taller than horses.
b. Horses are taller than cows.
c. Cows are (exactly) as tall as horses.
All of these are false in the actual world—the tallest horses are taller than the
tallest cows, and the shortest horses are shorter than the shortest cows. More-
over, the problem is not that cows and horses somehow resist comparison
with respect to height, as the truth of the examples in (16) shows.
(16) a. Cows are taller than cats.
b. Elephants are taller than horses.
exactly to ensure that we do not read it as a is at least as tall as b. I do not mean to imply
that anything turns on a particular standard of precision. I am also taking for granted that the
interpretation of the predicate F is the same in all all of the examples in (13). Some predicates can
be associated with different scales in different contexts, such as big or good. The reason to require
that these predicates are interpreted uniformly can be brought out with an example. Suppose
that John is taller and lighter than Bill. In that case, all of the following are false if we consider
the dimension of comparison indicated in parentheses.
(i) a. John is bigger (by weight) than Bill.
b. Bill is bigger (by height) than John.
c. John is (exactly) as big (by weight) as Bill.
But so long as we hold the dimension ﬁxed, the schemas in (13) jointly exhaust logical space and
one of them must be true.
11More generally, then, in the case of generic comparisons, the schemas in (17),
corresponding to (13), do not jointly exhaust logical space.
(17) a. As are F-er than Bs.
b. Bs are F-er than As.
c. As are (exactly) as F as Bs.
A proponent of the kind-predicating strategy thus needs to identify some
difference between comparisons of individuals and generic comparisons. One
initially plausible attempt points to vagueness: kinds cannot be assigned to
precise degrees on an associated scale, but only a vague range on such a scale.
And we know that, when vagueness is involved, sets of sentences that one
might think jointly cover all of logical space (so that at least one of them must
be true) can nonetheless all be false. If John is a borderline case of baldness,
then it might be false both that he is bald and that he is not.11
But the approach I’m considering on behalf of the kind-predicating strat-
egy is unpromising if we take the appeal to vagueness seriously. It is a com-
monplace that predicates that exhibit vagueness in their positive form do not
exhibit vagueness once they are in an explicitly comparative construction. Two
paint chips might both be on the borderline between orange and red, so that
neither (18a) nor (18b) are deﬁnitely true or deﬁnitely false.
(18) a. Chip1 is red.
b. Chip2 is red.
Even in this situation, the relevant instances of (13), given here in (19) exhaust
logical space and one of them is deﬁnitely true.
(19) a. Chip1 is redder than chip2.
b. Chip2 is redder than chip1.
c. Chip1 is (exactly) as red as chip2.
The proponent of the kind-predicating strategy should therefore not appeal
to vagueness as the model by which to explain the possibility that all of the
examples in (17) can be false at the same time.
11Giving up on classical logic in this way is one way of dealing with the initial phenomenon,
which is just that we ﬁnd neither John is bald nor John is not bald to be unproblematically acceptable.
For an overview of this and other options, see Williamson (1994).
12Instead, she might point to imprecision as a feature of a situation that is
preserved even once we move to explicit comparisons and that might account
for the observation about (17). However, imprecision generally does not in-
terfere with the usual logical relations. Suppose it is hard to tell exactly how
tall John and Bill are. We might model this by mapping them not to a precise
degree of height, but to a range of the scale. Even in that case, we are usually
happy to accept that one of the sentences in (14)—the height comparisons be-
tween John and Bill—is true, even if we don’t know which it is because our
measuring situation is unfavorable. Which sentence is true may well also de-
pend on subtle features of the context, but given standards of precision in a
context, one of them will be true.
The kind-predicating strategy is therefore unpromising. An appeal to
vagueness is untenable because vagueness disappears in comparatives. An
appeal to imprecision may be theoretically acceptable, but it does not allow
us to predict that all of the sentences are false. Thus, the logical relations that
generic comparisons enter into differ from those that comparisons involving
individual objects enter into, and the kind-predicating strategy cannot account
for this fact.
The problem I have raised for the kind-predicating strategy is a problem
for any strategy that seeks to aggregate all of the members of the kind that
the generic is about, assign that aggregate a single degree, and then compare
the degree assigned to one aggregate with that assigned to another aggregate.
For example, one might interpret a generic comparison by paraphrasing it
in terms of averages. On this approach, (3) is paraphrased as the average girl
does better than the average boy in grade school.12 This approach makes precisely
the same predictions as the kind-predicating strategy in that comparisons in-
volving averages pattern with comparisons between individual objects, not
generic comparisons. In general, one of the schemas in (20) must be true if
the average A and the average B can be assigned any degree of F-ness at all.
(20) a. The average A is F-er than the average B.
b. The average B is F-er than the average A.
c. The average A is (exactly) as F as the average B.
12Moreover, there are already detailed semantic proposals for average, so that a proponent of
the aggregative approach can simply help herself to them. See, e.g., Carlson and Pelletier (2002);
Kennedy and Stanley (forthcoming).
13Hence, any aggregative proposal that seeks to assign a single degree to all of
the members of the kind relevant to determining the truth of generic compar-
isons is inadequate.
3.2 An Alternative Generic Quantiﬁer
I now turn to a way of rejecting the assumption that the quantiﬁer that ap-
pears in generic comparisons is the usual strong one. This section focuses
on Cohen’s introduction of a so-called relative generic quantiﬁer. The discus-
sion is largely exploratory, since he is primarily concerned with sentences like
(5), Dutchmen are good sailors, and does not discuss generic comparisons.13
Nonetheless, I want to investigate whether we can extend his treatment to
comparative constructions because of the close semantic connection between
gradable predicates in their positive form, such as are good sailors, and com-
paratives.
To introduce Cohen’s system, let me begin with the core examples (1) and
(2), which he calls absolute generics. He interprets the generic quantiﬁer in
such a way that its restrictor is determined, at least in part, by the predicate
via its association with a set of alternatives. To interpret As are F, we have to
compute the set of alternatives alt(F). In most cases, F is included in alt(F),
and in most cases, the alternatives are mutually exclusive. For example, to
interpret (1), ravens are black, we associate the property of being black with
alternative colors. With that set in hand, Cohen gives the following truth
conditions.14
(21) As are F is true iff the probability that a randomly chosen A that also
satisﬁes at least one of the properties in alt(F) is F is greater than .5.
The reason to introduce alternatives is to solve the problem posed by sentences
such as lions have manes. If we interpreted this simply as saying that the prob-
ability that randomly chosen lion has a mane is greater than .5, we’d be com-
mitted to more than half of all lions having manes, which would mean that
we predict the sentence to be false. The set of alternatives alt(F) effectively
restricts the domain to lions with some form of ornamentation. However, Co-
hen accepts that his theory as applied (5) yields the truth conditions that the
13Except for a passing remark at Cohen (2004, 549).
14See Cohen (1999b, p. 37).
14probability that a randomly picked Dutch sailor is a good one is greater than
.5, and that is too strong.
In response, Cohen introduces relative generics, generic sentences that are
analyzed in terms of an alternative generic operator. Characterizing sentences
are therefore systematically ambiguous, depending on whether they are ana-
lyzed as absolute or relative. When As are F is analyzed as a relative generic,
we do not just consider the alternatives to F, but also the alternatives to A,
alt(A). In the case of (5), alt(A) might include other nationalities. Relative
generics have the truth conditions in (22).15
(22) As are F is true iff the probability that a randomly chosen A that satisﬁes
one of the alternatives in alt(A) is F is higher than the probability that
an arbitrarily chosen object that satisﬁes one of the members of alt(A)
and one of the members of alt(F) is F.
As applied to (5), this theory predicts the truth conditions that an arbitrar-
ily chosen Dutch sailor is more likely to be a good sailor than an arbitrarily
chosen sailor from one of the alternative nations. We can see why this inter-
pretation is aptly called relative. A relative generic requires for its truth that
the relevant members of the kind be more likely to satisfy the predicate than
members of some other kind(s), i.e., we are relating different kinds, such as
Dutchmen and Swiss.
So that we may evaluate this proposal, let me say how claims about prob-
abilities are related to facts “closer to the ground.” For our purposes, we can
simply translate talk of probabilities into talk of ratios. To say that the prob-
ability that a randomly picked Dutch sailor is good is higher than the prob-
ability that a randomly picked sailor from some other country is amounts to
the claim that the ratio of good Dutch sailors to Dutch sailors of any skill is
higher than the ratio of good sailors from other countries to sailors from these
countries of any skill.16
15See Cohen (1999b, 55f). One beneﬁt of Cohen’s strategy is that it makes the difference between
relative and absolute generics not completely ad hoc. As he argues in Cohen (2001), the difference
between the two readings can be reduced to a difference in the setting of one parameter, one we
also see in some non-generic cases involving many and often.
16Within the context of Cohen’s theory, the initial interpretation of generics in terms of prob-
abilities plays other roles than simply introducing ratios. It also allows him to motivate various
constraints on the classes within which the relevant ratios are assessed, what he calls homogeneity
constraints. For more discussion, see Cohen (1999a, 2004).
15Let me now consider whether we can make use of a relative generic quan-
tiﬁer to yield adequate semantics for generic comparisons. The most direct
application of the theory analyzes (3) as saying that a randomly picked girl
is more likely than a randomly picked member of alt(JgirlsK) to satisfy the
predicate does well in grade school. Given the context, especially the linguistic
context, it’s clear that alt(JgirlsK) just consists of the set of boys. (3) is thus
predicted to have the truth conditions (23).
(23) A randomly picked girl is more likely to do well in grade school than a
randomly picked boy.
As a sidenote, it is somewhat opaque how we could arrive at these truth con-
ditions compositionally. The question really turns on the interpretation of the
predicate does better than boys in grade school, and speciﬁcally boys. I’ve already
suggested that we cannot interpret it as an ordinary generic bare plural, which
in Cohen’s system is interpreted as an absolute generic. That would make the
reading too strong. And it is not immediately obvious what a relative reading
of that NP would amount to.
The best strategy I can imagine interprets the comparative morphology
and the comparative phrase as arguments of the relative generic operator di-
rectly. On this approach, the explicitly comparative generic (3) just supplies
the arguments explicitly that the positive (relative) generic has to take implic-
itly. For the particular case of (3), -er than boys simply speciﬁes that alt(JgirlsK)
contains the property of being a boy.
But I don’t want to focus on the compositional semantics. Even taking for
granted that we can predict (23) as stating the truth conditions of (3), there
are problems with the proposal. It predicts that a comparative generic has the
same truth conditions as a positive relative generic, so long as the same set of
alternatives are salient in the context. This prediction fails, as the examples in
(24) illustrate.
(24) a. Feathers are heavier than appleseeds, though of course no feathers
nor any appleseeds are heavy.
b. Molecules are larger than atoms, though of course no molecules
nor any atoms are large.
c. Dwarves are taller than hobbits, though of course no dwarves nor
any hobbits are tall.
16Each of these examples is predicted to be contradictory on the relative generic
strategy. Consider (24a), for example. The ﬁrst clause says that the incidence
of heavy feathers among feathers is higher than the incidence of heavy ap-
pleseeds among appleseeds. The second clause asserts that the incidence of
heavy feathers among feathers is the same as the incidence of heavy apple-
seeds among appleseeds—to wit, nil. But that is a straightforward contradic-
tion. And this prediction of a contradiction is unacceptable, since all of the
examples in (24) can be true.
One might object that what counts as heavy depends on the context, and
we can surely imagine contexts in which feathers count as heavy while apple-
seeds do not. So there is nothing wrong with saying that a randomly picked
feather is more likely to be heavy than a randomly picked appleseed. This is
true enough, but it is not enough to rescue the relative generic strategy. In
order for this rebuttal to defuse my objection, it must accept that the contex-
tually determined standard of heaviness changes between the interpretation
of the two clauses. That’s because the point of the objection is not that either
of the clauses feathers are heavier than appleseeds or neither feathers nor appleseeds
are heavy are unacceptable on their own. The point is that the relative generic
proposal I’m considering is committed to saying that they are contradictory
when they clearly are not. And the only way to avoid this prediction of con-
tradictoriness is to accept that the interpretation of heavy in the two clauses
changes. But in general, the context does not change in the course of inter-
preting the kind of sentence I am considering: I am tall, though of course I am
not tall is simply contradictory.
That the present proposal founders on such cases should be unsurprising,
since in general, a comparative can be true even though the corresponding
positive is false.
(25) a. Mary is taller than Sue, even though neither Mary nor Sue are tall.
b. John is richer than Bill, even though neither John nor Bill are rich.
This discussion at least strongly suggests that we won’t be able to extend the
relative generic strategy to deal with generic comparisons.17
17It seems to me that this result also casts doubt on the viability of the relative generic strategy
as it applies to its intended range of cases, such as (5). Given that the semantics of gradable
predicates in their positive and comparative forms are very closely related, we should expect a
proper treatment of their contribution to generic sentences to be uniform. Hence, any semantic
theory for the positive case does not extend to the comparative case is therefore undermined.
173.3 Dependent Plurals
I now turn to a way of rejecting the second assumption, that both bare plurals
are interpreted generically. The most reasonable way of implementing such a
rejection is to take the object NP as a dependent plural of the kind illustrated
in (26), due to Chomsky (1975).
(26) Unicycles have wheels.
Any one unicycle only has one wheel, so the plural morphology of the object
NP wheels does not indicate that any one of the objects picked out by the
subject has more than one wheel. Rather, it conveys roughly that between
them, the unicycles have more than one wheel.18 So to a good approximation,
a sentence with a dependent plural conveys that for each thing x denoted by
the subject, there is at least one thing y denoted by the object such that x stands
in the relation denoted by the predicate to y, and further, that the xs together
stand in that relation to more than one y. In other words, we can essentially
treat the bare plural in the object position as existentially quantiﬁed.
The point of the present proposal is perhaps best appreciated by contrast-
ing it with the interpretations of (3) that resulted from interpreting both bare
plurals in terms of a generic quantiﬁer, repeated here as (27).
(27) a.
£
gen x: Girl(x)
¤£
∃θ
¤¡
Does.Well(x,θ)∧
[gen y: Boy(y)](¬Does.Well(y,θ))
¢
b.
£
gen x: Girl(x)
¤£
∃θ
¤¡
Does.Well(x,θ)∧
¬[gen y: Boy(y)](Does.Well(y,θ))
¢
The present proposal simply replaces the second generic quantiﬁer with an
existential one, as in (28a) and (28b).
(28) a.
£
gen x: Girl(x)
¤£
∃θ
¤¡
Does.Well(x,θ)∧
[∃y: Boy(y)](¬Does.Well(y,θ))
¢
b.
£
gen x: Girl(x)
¤£
∃θ
¤¡
Does.Well(x,θ)∧
¬[∃y: Boy(y)](Does.Well(y,θ))
¢
18For more detailed discussion, see e.g., Spector (2007) and Zweig (2008) and references therein.
18These truth conditions are more extreme versions of the doubly-generic ones
(27b) and (28) and hence face the same problems, only more so. In this case,
(28a) is the weak member of the pair, saying that all normal (most) girls meet
or exceed a threshold of scholastic achievement that at least one boy fails to
meet or exceed—i.e., they all do better than the weakest boy. Again, this is far
too weak. (28b), by contrast, is far too strong, since it says that all normal girls
do better than any boy, i.e., better than even the strongest boy.
Consider now what happens when we weaken the dependent-plural anal-
ysis by combining it not with a strong generic quantiﬁer but with Cohen’s
weaker, relative generic operator. Since this weakens the predicted truth con-
ditions, we need not consider (28a) with the relative generic operator. Focus
instead on (28b). The relative interpretations of generics, recall, compares the
likelihood that a randomly picked member of one set has a property of in-
terest with the likelihood that a randomly picked member of some other set
or sets (the alternatives) has that property. As before, I’ll assume that the ini-
tial set is the set of girls and that the alternative set is the set of boys. The
property is somewhat complex: it is the property of meeting or exceeding a
threshold that no boy meets or exceeds. Reﬂecting on this property shows us
immediately that the incidence of this property among the set of boys is, by
necessity, nil. Hence, the relative generic version of (28b) is true so long as
the probability that a randomly picked girl does better than any boy is greater
than 0, i.e., so long as the best student is a girl. In other words, on the relative
generic version of (28b), the sentence is simply equivalent to the claim that the
best student is a girl. These truth conditions are also clearly wrong, since they
can be satisﬁed when a single girl is the best student, while all of the worst
students are made up by the remainder of the girls.
Thus, even if we reject one or more of the three assumptions I’ve discussed
so far, we still won’t have an empirically and theoretically viable treatment of
generic comparisons.
4 Generics, Covers, and Comparatives
I now turn to my proposal. It rejects the assumption that the generic quantiﬁ-
cational element is either a nominal determiner or an adverb of quantiﬁcation.
To introduce an alternative, I’ll discuss some phenomena in non-generic plu-
19rals that are very similar to those observed for generic comparatives, along
with a theoretical treatment in terms of covers.19
As I emphasized in the beginning, generic comparisons can be true even if
it’s not the case that gen-many elements picked out by the subject term stand
in the relation to gen-many elements picked out by the object term. In my
critical discussion of other proposals, I also drew attention to two other facts.
First, it’s possible for every sentence in the schema (17) to be false.
(17) a. As are F-er than Bs.
b. Bs are F-er than As.
c. As are (exactly) as F as Bs.
The sandwich scenario I offered in the previous section is an instance of this
pattern. All of the examples in (29) are false when evaluated as descriptions
of this scenario.
(29) a. Girls do better than boys in grade school.
b. Boys do better than girls in grade school.
c. Girls do as well as boys in grade school.
This also immediately shows that the whole distribution of girls and boys is
relevant to determining the truth or falsity of these examples. It will not do to
simply interpret As are F-er than Bs as requiring that the most F As are F-er
than the most F Bs. In this case, it would amount to interpreting boys do better
than girls in grade school as saying that the best boys do better than the best
girls, and clearly, that condition is satisﬁed in the sandwich scenario, even
though the original generic comparison is false.
I’ll now argue that we see precisely corresponding phenomena when we
consider the interpretation of comparatives in non-generic plurals. I’ll use that
observation to motivate a treatment of generic comparisons that is modeled
very closely on the non-generic case.
4.1 Comparatives in Non-Generic Plurals
Just as in the case of generic comparisons, comparisons involving two plural
deﬁnite descriptions can be true even when not all of the things denoted by
19For a thorough introduction to covers, see especially Gillon (1987, 1992); Schwarzschild (1994,
1996).
20the one description stand in the relevant relation to all of the things denoted
by the other. (30)-(32) illustrate the structure.
(30) The Hatﬁelds are taller than the McCoys.
(31) The frigates are faster than the destroyers.
(32) The buses that ran today were emptier than the subways that ran today.
Each of these has an appropriately weak reading. (30) has a reading that
requires only that the Hatﬁeld men are taller than the McCoy men, the Hat-
ﬁeld women taller than the McCoy women, and so on. (31) is discussed by
Schwarzschild, who observes that it’s true in the following situation. The ﬂeet
has seen two model years, so that there are new and old frigates along with
new and old destroyers. The ﬂeet is deployed to two different areas, one in
which a speedy response is important, one in which it is not, so that the newer
frigates and destroyers are deployed to the former area and the older frigates
and destroyers to the latter. (31) is true even if the advances in naval technol-
ogy are such that the newer destroyers are faster than the older frigates, so
long as within each area, the frigates are faster than the destroyers. Finally,
(32) has a reading on which it’s true if the buses were emptier than the sub-
ways running at the same time, even if the rush-hour buses weren’t emptier
than the late-night subways.
Note crucially that the interpretation of the data I am giving is consistent
with an exhaustive interpretation of the plural NPs, i.e., that a predicate is
truly predicated of a plural description only if it truly applies to all of the
things denoted by it.20 Brisson (2003) has suggested that in some cases, ex-
haustivity is suspended. She focuses on examples such as the girls jumped in the
lake, which does not entail that every single one of the (contextually salient)
girls jumped. However, trying to account for the data on comparatives by
suggesting that exhaustivity is suspended is unpromising here. If the reason
for the acceptability of (say) (31) was that the fast destroyers were irrelevant
to the truth in the way that some girls are irrelevant to the truth of the girls
jumped in the lake, then no matter what was the case with the irrelevant ships,
the truth value of (31) should not change. But that is not what we ﬁnd. If the
fast destroyers were faster than the fast frigates, (31) would be clearly false. So
20See, e.g., Fodor (1970); Sharvy (1980) for reasons for adopting this view.
21just as in the case of the generic comparisons, members of both kinds across
the whole distribution matter to the interpretation of the comparison.
The approach to these data that I will discuss makes use of the technical
apparatus of covers, which we can introduce as a generalization of simple
distributivity. When a plural NP is used distributively, it is used to summarize
what a number of things did individually. This contrasts with collective uses,
where the predicate that applies to the collection does not apply to each of its
members. (33) illustrates both.
(33) a. The children woke up at 8:00.
b. The children gathered in the yard.
(33a) entails that each of the children woke up at 8:00, while (33b) does not
entail that each of the children gathered in the yard.
We could assume that distributivity is simply a brute feature of certain
verbs, so that distributivity or collectivity is part of their lexical meaning. As
several theorists have argued, a better account posits a distributive operator
D.21 As a rough ﬁrst approximation, we assume that a plural NP picks out
a plurality and that the distributive operator applies to a VP. Assuming that
the children picks out some contextually determined children, the LF of (33a)
is given in (34a). (34b) gives the truth conditions we would like for (34a), and
(34c) is the semantic value of the distributive operator. (I use capital variables
to indicate that the variable ranges over pluralities, and the expression Xx to
indicate that x is among the Xs.)
(34) a.
£
S[NThe children][VD woke up at eight]
¤
.
b.
£
∀x: Among.The.Children(x)
¤¡
Woke.Up.At.Eight(x)
¢
c. JDK = λf.λX.
£
∀x: Xx = 1
¤¡
f(x) = 1
¢
However, positing a simple distributive operator does not allow us to capture
all of the semantic possibilities for interpreting sentences containing plural
NPs, because there are sentences that aren’t collective, but in which the predi-
cate cannot be distributed all the way down to the individuals making up the
plurality, either. Suppose we’re buying apples. Each apple costs ﬁfty cents,
21See, e.g., Beck and Sauerland (2000), Landmann (2000), Lasersohn (1995), McKay (2006),
Pietroski (2005), Schein (1993), Schwarzschild (1996), Winter (2000).
22and we buy twelve. We can describe that situation accurately both by (35a)
and (35b).22
(35) a. The apples cost ﬁfty cents.
b. The apples cost six dollars.
We can predict both of these readings. In (35a), the VP contains the D operator,
while it is absent in (35b). But if the apples come pre-wrapped in six-packs,
we can also truly describe the situation with (36).
(36) The apples cost three dollars.
We’ve already exhausted the possibilities with respect to the D operator in
the LF of these sentences. When it’s present, (35a) is true while (35b) and (36)
are false. When it’s absent, (35b) is true and the other two false. Either way,
we cannot predict the true reading of (36). What we’d like is a formal way of
capturing roughly the paraphrase (37) of (36).
(37) The apples are such that six among them cost three dollars.
The predicate is not distributed to each of the objects picked out by the subject
term, but rather to collections that in turn make up the collection picked out
by the subject term, in this case, the pre-wrapped sixpacks.
That suggests that we should allow the distributive operator to distribute
the predicate not just to the atoms, but to subclasses of the plurality denoted
by the subject. Moreover, it seems as if the possibility of such intermediate
readings depends heavily on the context. Without the information that the
apples come in sixpacks, (36) is extremely hard to hear as true. Once we’ve
made the sixpacks salient, the relevant reading becomes available. That sug-
gests that the distributive operator should be sensitive to the context.
The key formal tool to accomplish all of these goals is that of a cover, which
for our purposes we can simply treat as a partition.
£
cover
¤
Where A is a set, C covers A iff
(i) C is a set of subsets of A, and
22Examples like these are due to the work of Roger Schwarzschild, as is the introduction of
covers to account for them. See Schwarzschild (1994, 1996).
23(ii) (∀x ∈ A)(∃!B)(B ⊆ A ∧ B ∈ C ∧ x ∈ B), and
(iii) ∅ / ∈ C.23
That is, a set of sets C covers a set A just in case for every member of A, there
is exactly one subset of A that contains that member, and that subset is in C.
In the case of the apples, for example, A consists of the twelve apples, and the
contextually salient cover C consists of two subsets, each of which contains
the members of one sixpack.
We now need to incorporate covers into the semantics of the distributive
operator. According to (34c), D takes a predicate as argument and returns
another one. We now let D take two arguments, a predicate as before, as well
as a contextually determined cover cov. Thus, the LF of (36) is given by (38a)
and the truth conditions are (38b). On the assumption that the denotation
of cov indeed is the set of two sets containing six apples each, these truth
conditions are the ones we wanted to predict. Here and in what follows, I
will treat it as a presupposition that the contextually supplied cover covers
the collection picked out by the subject.24
(38) a.
£
S[NPThe apples][VP[D cov] cost three dollars]
¤
.
b. Presupposition: JcovK covers JThe applesK
Assertion:
£
∀y: y ∈ JcovK
¤¡
Cost.Three.Dollars(y)
¢
More generally, the LF of a simple subject-predicate sentence with a non-
generic plural is given in (39a), the corresponding truth conditions in (39b),
and the semantic value of the revised D operator in (39c).25
(39) a.
£
S[NPThe AsPL][VP[D cov]F]
¤
b. Presupposition: JcovK covers JAK
Assertion:
£
∀y: y ∈ JcovK
¤¡
JFK(y) = 1
¢
23This is usually called a cover, rather than simply a partition because covers are supposed to
allow that for some members of A, there is more than one subset in C, each of which contains
that member. This is impossible for partitions. But that’s a complication we can ignore, so that
I’ll remain with partitions.
24Though the interpretation of the cover argument depends on the context, I’ll suppress explicit
reference to the context throughout for ease of exposition. Thus, in (38b), we are really evaluating
JcoviK
g, i.e., an indexed cover variable that is assigned a value by the contextually salient assign-
ment function (see Heim and Kratzer, 1998). But nothing I say will depend on being explicit
about this.
25I use the notation λα : β.γ to express that the λ-abstract carries the presupposition that β is
satisﬁed.
24c. JDK = λc.λf.λX: c covers X.
h£
∀x: x ∈ c
¤¡
f(x) = 1
¢i
Distribution to the atoms is then simply the special case in which the cover
consists of singleton sets, each of which contains just one of the members of
the set picked out by the subject term.26
We’re very close to having an account of the example of the frigates and
the destroyers. All we need to do is generalize the semantics presented thus
far to sentences that contain a transitive verb and a plural noun phrase as a
direct object. Following Schwarzschild, I assume that covers need not just be
sets of sets. They can also be sets of pairs of sets. Formally, we introduce
paired covers.
£
paired cover
¤
T is a paired cover of  A,B  iff
there is a cover of A, call it CA, and there is a cover of B, call it CB, such
that
(i) T ⊆ CA × CB.
(ii) (∀x ∈ CA)(∃y ∈ CB)( x,y  ∈ T)
(iii) (∀y ∈ CB)(∃x ∈ CA)( x,y  ∈ T)
In order to accommodate paired covers in the semantics, I’ll introduce a dis-
tributive operator DT (the subscript T indicates that it is suitable for inter-
preting transitive verbs), which takes as one of its arguments such a paired
cover.
We can then give the truth conditions of our initial target sentence (31), by
assigning it the LF (31a) and the truth conditions (31b).
(31) The frigates are faster than the destroyers.
a.
£
S[NPThe frigates
¤h
VP
£
[DT covT] are faster than
¤
the destroyers
i
b. Presupposition: JcovTK covers  Jthe frigatesK,Jthe destroyersK 
i
Assertion:
h
∀ p1, p2 :  p1, p2  ∈ JcovTK
i³
Faster( p1, p2 )
´
26A formal note: the proposal I’m discussing in the text has the result that a distributive reading
of a sentence with a plural subject predicates the property denoted by the vp of a singleton set
containing an atom making up the plurality. This analysis thus implicitly relies on the convention
that we may conﬂate a singleton set with its member for the purposes of the semantics. This idea
is due to Quine (2004).
25The next issue concerns interpreting the nuclear scope in (31b), especially
when the paired cover does not distribute all the way to the atoms of the
pluralities denoted by the subject and object. Assume for concreteness that
the old frigates are F1, F2, F3, the new frigates F4 and F5, the old destroyers
are D1 and D2 and the new destroyers D3 and D4. Assume also that the
contextually salient cover covT contains the pairs in (40).
(40) JcovTK =
©
 {F1, F2, F3},{D1,D2} , {F4, F5},{D3,D4} 
ª
.
So in order to evaluate (31b), we have to evaluate (41).
(41) Faster
³-
{F1, F2, F3},{D1,D2}
®´
Here, two sets are compared. I propose that we introduce the following mean-
ing postulate. When we compare two sets, the asserted relation holds between
the two sets iff it holds between any pair of atoms from the two sets.
(42) JcompK
¡
 S1,S2 
¢
= 1 iff
£
∀x: x ∈ S1
¤£
∀y: y ∈ S2
¤¡
JcompK( x,y ) = 1
¢
This postulate requires that each of F1, F2, and F3 is faster than any of D1 or
D2. The motivation for adopting this assumption comes from reﬂecting on
the following example from Schwarzschild (1996, 86). Consider table 1, which
can be truly described by (43).
Fiction Non-ﬁction
Alice in Wonderland Aspects
Language (Bloomﬁeld)
Fantastic Voyage Gray’s Anatomy
David Copperﬁeld Das Kapital
Hard Times The Wealth of Nations
Oedipus Rex Freud’s Introduction to Psychology
Agamemnon
Richard III Machiavelli’s The Prince
Table 1: Books
26(43) The ﬁction books complement the non-ﬁction books.
The true reading comes about when we assume that a pair-cover is contex-
tually salient which pairs books from the same line. Crucially, (43) becomes
false if we add a non-corresponding book to any of the lines. That’s why I
suggest we impose the demanding condition that the relation holds between
every pair that can be formed from the two sets.
We can now state the general view, where the schematic LF (44a) is as-
signed the truth conditions (44b), and the semantic value of the transitive
distributive quantiﬁer is given in (44c).
(44) a.
Subj
DT covT
TransVerb
Obj
b. Presupposition: JcovTK covers  JSubjK,JObjK 
Assertion:
h
∀ p1, p2 :  p1, p2  ∈ JcovTK
i
³
JTransVerbK( p1, p2 ) = 1
´
c. JDTK = λc.λf.λX.λY: c covers  X,Y . h£
∀ p1, p2  :  p1, p2  ∈ c
¤¡
f( p1, p2 )
¢i
In this presentation I am skirting over several large issues, in particular, over
how distributivity interacts with comparative morphology to compositionally
determine the interpretation I am giving here.27 What is crucial for my pur-
poses is that the distributive operator applies to the predicate before it applies
to the subject and object.28 Since the relevant readings are clearly attested, and
this assumption seems to be quite clearly required in order to derive them, I’ll
remain at this level of generality.
But even at this level of description, we can already see that the semantics
for non-generic comparisons predicts the following fact about logical relations.
Consider the schemata in (45).
27For relevant discussion, see Fitzgibbons et al. (forthcoming) and references therein.
28I assume that this occurs via movement of the subject and object, but I’ll suppress the in-
terpretation of the movement. For discussion, see Beck and Sauerland (2000); Sauerland (1998);
Sternefeld (1998).
27(45) a. The As are F-er than the Bs.
b. The Bs are F-er than the As.
c. The As are (exactly) as F as the Bs.
The semantics I’ve just presented immediately predicts that all of these can
be false. The basic point is just that the three schemata in (45) do not jointly
exhaust the space of possibilities. Suppose that we have a paired cover over
the As and the Bs. It may be true that for some pairs in that cover, the As in
that pair are F-er than the Bs while for other pairs, the Bs are F-er than the As.
In that situation, all of the schemata in (45) are false.
And crucially, the semantics makes that prediction precisely because the As
and the Bs throughout the distribution of F-ness are relevant to determining
the truth of (45a)-(45c), not just the As and the Bs that are F-est, or the average
A and the average B.
4.2 Covers in Generic Comparisons
The fact that we see such a close parallel in the logical relations among non-
generic comparatives involving plurals and generic comparisons suggests that
we can make progress on the latter by adapting the semantics of the former.
That’s what I’ll do right now.
In the case of the non-generic plurals, the basic quantiﬁcational force de-
rives from a distributive operator, so the most direct way of transferring this
mechanism is to treat the generic operator not as a nominal determiner nor as
an adverb of quantiﬁcation, but as a distributive operator. Moreover, the anal-
ogy with the universal distributive operator in the non-generic case suggests
that we treat the generic operator as a universal quantiﬁer of some stripe.
Clearly, characterizing sentences are not well-paraphrased as universally
quantiﬁed claims, since they are compatible with what would be counterex-
amples to the corresponding universal claim. Hence, we should interpret the
generic operator as a restricted universal quantiﬁer. For the purposes of this
paper, I’ll say that the restriction is to the normal members of a kind. It’s obvi-
ously extremely difﬁcult to say what makes a member of a kind normal in any
kind of general way, but when we are confronted with a particular generic, we
have a clear enough sense of which members of the kind are intuitively rele-
vant to its truth and which ones are not. For example, when we’re evaluating
28(3), we’re not interested in academic outliers. We have a notion of a normal
student, girl or boy, and the generic is evaluated with respect to those girls
and boys, not the ones that are exceptionally good or exceptionally bad.
Quantiﬁcational accounts generally need to make the restriction of the
quantiﬁer sensitive to the predicate of the generic. The need for this is most
easily brought out by considering the pair of sentences (46).
(46) a. Chickens lay eggs.
b. Chickens are hens.
If the restriction of the quantiﬁer was the same in both (46a) and (46b), then
(46a) would entail (46b). After all, since a chicken lays eggs only if it is a hen,
(46a) requires that all of the chickens in the scope of the quantiﬁer are hens,
and if the scope of the quantiﬁer in (46b) was the same, it would follow that
chickens are hens. Informally, we might say that what is at issue is not being
a normal chicken, but being a chicken that is normal in a respect, and that the
respect is determined by the predicate of the characterizing sentence. Thus,
(46a) might be about all of the chickens that are normal with respect to how
chickens extrude offspring (and no male qualiﬁes for being normal in this
respect), while (46b) might be about all of the chickens that are normal with
respect to having a gender (which includes both female and male chickens).29
It is also true that generics can be non-vacuously true, even when there
are no normal members of the kind at issue in the world of evaluation at the
time of evaluation. To take a simple example, lions have four legs can be non-
vacuously true even when there aren’t any normal lions, perhaps because all
of the lions have lost a leg in accidents or ﬁghts. That means that when we
evaluate a generic, we always need to ensure that we evaluate the restricted
universal quantiﬁer with respect to a suitably representative domain. One way
to accomplish this is to introduce a counterfactual element into the semantics.
Simple generic sentences of the form (47a) are thus interpreted as (47b).
(47) a. As are B.
b. If there was a relevantly normal A, then all relevantly normal As
would be B.
29Cohen implements the same strategy by using a set of alternatives to the predicate in order
to restrict the domain of his generic operator.
29Here, relevantly normal just abbreviates normal in the respect determined by the
predicate. If there are relevantly normal As in the world of evaluation at the
time of evaluation, then (47b) just collapses into a simple quantiﬁcational
claim. Moreover, we see a useful interplay between the fact that we need
to consider not normal As, but relevantly normal As, since that helps make
the counterfactual strategy work. Suppose, for example, that we were inter-
ested in evaluating lions have manes and analyzed it as if there were any normal
lions, then all normal lions would have manes. We would not have any grounds
for denying that female lions are normal lions. Hence, we would predict that
lions have manes is false. But by restricting the generic quantiﬁer to those li-
ons that are normal with respect to their ornamentation, we may exclude the
female lions.
The rest of this section is devoted to combining this basic semantic theory
for non-comparative generics with the semantics for non-generic compara-
tives. Return to (3), girls do better than boys in grade school, for illustration.
Suppose that we’ve decided on the relevantly normal boys and girls, exclud-
ing the outliers, and suppose that the shift-scenario obtains.
Here is a way of assigning truth conditions to (3) that makes the correct
prediction. We match up subsets of the girls with subsets of the boys, where
each of the subsets comprises a certain part of the distribution, for example
pairing deciles of girls with corresponding deciles of boys. The sentence is
true iff within each such pairing, each of the girls does better than any of the
boys. Graphically, we can represent this strategy as in ﬁgure 2, where areas
that are shaded the same way are compared to each other.
Girls
Boys
%
Achievement
Figure 2: Correspondences for shift
That is the informal idea I now give a formally more rigorous implemen-
tation of. I’ll go stepwise, beginning with simple sentences and adding com-
30plexity as I go along. If gen occupies the position of a distributive operator,
and ignoring covers for now, the LF of the simple characterizing sentence (1),
repeated here as (48), is (48a).
(48) Ravens are black.
a.
£
S[NP ravens ][VP[ gen black ]
¤
Thus, I want to interpret the LF (48a) as having the truth conditions (48b),
which we can achieve compositionally if gen has the lexical semantics in (48c).
(48) b.
£
∀x: Relevantly.Normal(x) ∧ Raven(x)
¤¡
Black(x)
¢
.
c. JgenK = λf.λg.
h£
∀x : Relevantly.Normal(x) ∧ g(x)
¤¡
f(x) = 1
¢i
We can immediately introduce covers. Just as the distributive operator takes
an extra cover argument, the generic quantiﬁer gen does, too. The only impor-
tant change we have to make is to alter the interpretation of the subject term
to be more in line with the denotation of non-generic plurals. Rather than
have the subject term pick out a property, it should pick out the plurality of
members of the kind. The relevant LFs, truth conditions, and lexical semantics
are given in (49).
(49) a.
£
S[NP subj ][VP[ gen cov ] pred ]
¤
b. JgenK = λc.λf.λX: c covers X.
h£
∀x: Relevantly.Normal(x) ∧ x ∈ c
¤¡
f(x) = 1
¢i
As before, quantiﬁcation over the atoms in the set picked out by the subject
term falls out as a special case.
To account for the interpretation of generic comparisons, I make use of
paired covers. Thus, I want to offer roughly the LF (50a) as the interpretation
of (3), and the semantics for the nodes in the tree in (??).
31(50) a. δ
Girls γ
β
α
genT covT
VP
do better than
boys
b. JGirlsK = {x: x is a girl}
JBoysK = {y: y is a boy}
Jdo better thanK = λY.λX.[X does better in grade school than Y]
q
genT
y
= λc.λfλY.λX: c covers  X,Y .
£
∀ p1, p2 :  p1, p2  ∈ c∧
Relevantly.Normal(p1) ∧ Relevantly.Normal(p2)
¤¡
f(p2)(p1) = 1
¢
J
The derivation of (3), given this information, is the following.
£
derivation of J3K
¤
JαK = λfλY.λX: JcovTK covers  X,Y .
£
∀ p1, p2 :  p1, p2  ∈ JcovTK∧
Relevantly.Normal(p1) ∧ Relevantly.Normal(p2)
¤¡
f(p2)(p1) = 1
¢
JβK = λY.λX: JcovTK covers  X,Y .
£
∀ p1, p2 :  p1, p2  ∈ JcovTK∧
Relevantly.Normal(p1) ∧ Relevantly.Normal(p2)
¤
¡
p1 does better in grade school than p2
¢
JγK = λX: JcovTK covers  X,{y: y is a boy} . h£
∀ p1, p2 :  p1, p2  ∈ JcovTK∧
Relevantly.Normal(p1) ∧ Relevantly.Normal(p2)
¤
¡
p1 does better in grade school than p2
¢i
JδK = Presupposition: JcovTK covers  {x: x is a girl},{y: y is a boy} 
Assertion:
£
∀ p1, p2 :  p1, p2  ∈ JcovTK∧
Relevantly.Normal(p1) ∧ Relevantly.Normal(p2)
¤
¡
p1 does better in grade school than p2
¢
32That is to say, for every pairing in the contextually salient cover, every girl in
the pairing does better in grade school than every boy in that pairing. Given
that the contextually salient cover pairs up girls and boys in the same decile
in the distribution, we have the following interpretation of (3): it is true just in
case every girl in the top decile of girls does better than every boy in the top
decile of boys, and so on down the distribution of scholastic achievement.
This proposal requires some further comments before I discuss its beneﬁts.
First, one might worry that these truth conditions are too demanding. For
concreteness, consider a situation in which all but one girl is better than all
of the boys, but in which the weakest student is a girl. One might think
that my semantics predicts that (3) is false—after all, this is just an extreme
sandwich-style scenario—but that intuitively, (3) is true.
This objection is too quick, and to see why, it will help to spell out the
situation further. Different ways of spelling it out will yield different intuitive
truth-value judgments, and my proposal is in accord with these judgments.
The crucial question is whether the very weak girl is normal for the purposes
of evaluating (3). Perhaps we are thinking about (3) in the context of designing
social policy, or wondering why women aren’t more heavily represented in
many academic disciplines. So now suppose that the weakest girl is doing
poorly in school because of a learning deﬁcit. In that case, she is not normal
for the purposes of evaluating (3), so that she is not in the scope of the generic
operator and my semantics makes the intuitively correct prediction that (3) is
true. Suppose, however, that this girl is in no relevant way different from the
girls at the top, aside from her level of achievement—there is nothing we could
point to that certiﬁes her as an outlier. In that case, my semantics predicts that
(3) is indeed false.
A potentially confounding factor may be the fact that whenever we see a
single girl or a single boy in a chunk of the distribution, we naturally assume
that this child is an outlier. After all, there are so many kids that generally
shared factors should produce the same outcome in multiple cases. That’s
why in the extreme situation I just described, the easiest judgment is that (3)
is true. And the prediction of my semantics conforms to that judgment.30
30An anonymous referee has emphasized a conﬂicting intuition regarding this example. Even if
the weakest student is a girl and she is completely normal, it can be true that girls do better than
boys in grade school. I can see at least two possible responses to this observation. The ﬁrst is that
comparative generics are simply ambiguous between the reading I have been focusing on and a
33One may, of course, also worry about my appeal to an unanalyzed notion
of normality in the semantics. And it is certainly true that it can be hard to
determine what exactly counts as normal for the purposes of evaluating (3):
what factors determine whether a distribution is normal for our purposes?
But I take it to be an advantage of my account that it leaves these questions
open. After all, it happens quite frequently, especially when we’re considering
topics like gender differences, that speakers agree on the statistical facts but
disagree on the generic facts. I diagnose this as a disagreement over what
counts as relevantly normal.
Finally, let me brieﬂy address what happens when we do not have a rep-
resentative domain. Because of some random ﬂuke, a part of the distribution
that is normally occupied by some girls is completely vacant. Perhaps it just
so happened that all of the high-performing girls moved away. It is in order to
deal with this problem that I suggest that the cover itself be intensional. That
allows me to say the following: it has to be the case for each pair  Ai,Bi  in
the paired cover over the normal As and the normal Bs that, if there were As
and Bs in the cells Ai and Bi, then each of the As in Ai would be F-er than
any of the B in Bi. For the special case of (3): for each pair  Girlsi,Boysi  in
the contextually selected paired cover over the normal girls and normal boys,
if there were any girls in Girlsi and any boys in Boysi, then each of the girls
in Girlsi would do better in grade school than any of the boys in Boysi. In
other words, the counterfactual strategy for dealing with non-representative
domains I introduced above for non-comparative generics can be directly ex-
tended here.
In §3.1, I observed that the logical relations among generic comparisons do
not mirror those of comparatives involving individual objects. Schematically,
all of the sentences in (17) can be false.
(17) a. As are F-er than Bs.
b. Bs are F-er than As.
c. As are (exactly) as F as Bs.
reading in terms of averages. The second is that, once we have relatively large groups, we allow
for a bit of imprecision in our speaking. Regarding the second point, notice that how good (3) is
in a situation in which the weakest student is a girl seems to vary with how large the population
of students is: the more students, the easier it is to disregard the weakest girl as somehow not
standing in the way of (3)’s truth. I leave as an open problem how this kind of situation can be
handled.
34My semantics predicts that this is possible without further assumptions. I’ll
give the argument for the particular example of (3). That is, I’ll show that the
three claims in (29), repeated from earlier, can all be false in the sandwich
scenario.
(29) a. Girls do better than boys in grade school. [=(3)]
b. Boys do better than girls in grade school.
c. Girls do as well as boys in grade school.
Given the semantics I worked out for (29a), it is true iff within each decile,
every girl does better than every boy. Since there are some deciles in which
each of the boys do better than the girls—the ones at the top—it is false that
girls do better than boys. By parallel reasoning, (29b) is true iff within each
decile, every boy does better than every girl. Since there are some deciles
in which each of the girls does better than any of the boys—the ones at the
bottom—it is false that boys do better than girls. Finally, (29c) is true iff
within each decile, the girls do as well as the boys. It doesn’t matter how
exactly we make precise the notion of one group’s doing as well as another.
For concreteness, assume that two groups do equally well when the top girl
does as well as the top boy in that group, and the bottom girl does as well as
the bottom boy in that group. However we choose to settle the matter, it will
always turn out that some of the deciles fail that condition, for example, the
top deciles in which the boys do far better than the girls.
4.3 Dimensions of Contextual Variation
My semantics combines two distinct semantic features to yield interpretations
for generic comparisons, a univocal generic operator that I’m glossing as a
restricted universal quantiﬁer and a contextually selected paired cover. Since
both of these features are present in sentences besides generic comparisons,
we should be able to ﬁnd commonalities between generic comparisons and
those sentences in which one, but not the other, of the features is present. I
want to argue that this is exactly what we do ﬁnd, focusing on kinds of con-
textual variability, beginning with variability in the contextually determined
cover and then turning to contextual variability in what counts as normal.
Consider the two sentences in (51).
35(51) a. Men are taller than women.
b. Fathers are taller than mothers.
On its most salient reading, (51a) is true. We simply compare the distribution
of men and women with respect to height and pair up occupants of corre-
sponding parts. By contrast, (51b) has two natural readings, one on which it
is true, another on which it is false. The true reading is the one that is par-
allel to the reading of (51a) I just described: we compare the tallest men who
happen to be fathers with the tallest women who happen to be mothers, the
less tall such men with the less tall such women, and so on down the dis-
tribution. However, (51b) also has a very natural reading on which we don’t
pair the tallest men who happen to be fathers with the tallest women who
happen to be mothers, but instead pair each father with the mother of their
common child or children. In that case, (51b) is false because there are plenty
of pairings consisting of fathers and mothers, both of whom fall in the respec-
tive normal height ranges where the father is shorter than the corresponding
mother. We can make this latter reading salient by mentioning this kind of
pairing, as in (52).
(52) Couples with kids can be very varied—fathers (certainly) aren’t taller
than mothers.
The very same phenomenon is present in non-generic plurals, as (53) shows.
(53) Even though the couples in our study were not married, the men did
display aggressive behavior towards the women. (Schwarzschild, 1996,
87, #209)
The concessive in the ﬁrst part of the sentence makes salient a pairing of men
and women according to the couples that were formed, and the main clause
is interpreted with respect to this pairing. If we remove the concessive, this
reading becomes harder to hear.
(54) In our study, the men displayed aggressive behavior towards the women.
It is clear that there is some matching of men with women, though for all that
the context provides, it could be that every man in the study displayed the
behavior towards every woman in the study.
Turn now to contextual variation in what counts as normal. Consider (55).
36(55) Dogs are heavier than cats.
It is clear that, at the top of the distribution, dogs are far heavier than cats.
Indeed, this is true for most parts of the size-distribution. The interesting
aspect of the case is located at the bottom of the distribution, speciﬁcally
when we consider so-called tea-cup dogs, breeds of dogs that are lighter than
even the lightest cats. These tea-cup dogs exist only because of very targeted
selection by breeders, and individuals of these species usually suffer from
health problems and various genetic disorders. Given this information, the
sentence (55) has at least a true and a false reading, depending on whether we
take tea-cup breeds into account. Put in terms of the proposal I am putting
forth, the difference between the context in which (55) expresses a truth and
one in which it expresses a falsehood is simply a matter of whether such
intervention by breeders disqualiﬁes a dog from being normal.
The point I want to draw attention to is that the very same kind of contex-
tual variability can be seen in non-comparative generics, as the texts in (56a)
and (56b) show. Some background: at birth, dobermans have ﬂoppy ears and
long tails. In many countries, including the US, breeders then surgically insert
posts into the ears that remain there for about six weeks until the cartilage in
the ears hardens, at which point the posts are removed. They also dock the
dogs’ tails.
(56) a. Different breeds of dogs focus on different senses. Some dogs have
very acute hearing, while others have a specialized sense of smell.
The latter have ﬂoppy ears that agitate the air when they’re follow-
ing a trail. This is true of dobermans: they don’t have pointy ears, they
have ﬂoppy ears.
b. Welcome to the Westminster Kennel Club show. We have a wide
range of dogs, some homely, some truly regal. The dobermans are
beautiful, dynamic creatures. Dobermans have pointy ears. They don’t
have ﬂoppy ears.
In each context set up by the discourses preceding the italicized sentences, we
can deny a sentence that is asserted in the other. That shows that the difference
between (56a) and (56b) really is a difference in the proposition expressed,
and not just a pragmatic phenomenon that doesn’t inﬂuence semantics. We
37can thus observe kinds of contextual variation in sentences other than generic
comparisons.
The discussion of these examples illustrates a general strategy for testing
the proposal I’ve made. If we see contextual variability in the interpretation
of generic comparisons, we should be able to trace it to an aspect of their
interpretation that they share with either non-generic plural comparisons or
non-comparative generics. These examples suggest that this strategy can, in
fact, be carried out.
5 Conclusion
I’ve argued that generic comparisons exhibit a range of interpretations that are
problematic for extant semantic treatments. I’ve also argued that these prob-
lems can all be solved in a theoretically motivated way if we treat generics not
as quantiﬁcational constructions or instances of direct reference to kinds, but
as plural constructions making use of a special generic distributive operator.
Clearly, such a reconﬁguration of the LF of generics will have many other
implications, a fuller exploration of which I leave to further work.
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